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THE WIAA AS A STATE ACTOR: A 
DECADE LATER, BRENTWOOD 
ACADEMY’S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON 
WISCONSIN INTERSCHOLASTIC 
SPORTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For almost every rule, there is an exception.  And, for every exception 
made, there are countless others that are denied.  The Wisconsin 
Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) bylaws exemplify this axiom.  
If an athlete believes he should be exempt from a rule, he is able to apply for a 
waiver.  Through the tedious waiver process, it is inherent that not all athletes 
will feel that they had their “day in court” or the chance to have their case 
fairly heard.  Some athletes will believe that they were slighted or wronged by 
the WIAA’s denial of their waiver.  This Comment will pose a hypothetical 
situation where standout high school football player Mike Stasiewski feels so 
wronged that he brings a claim against the WIAA for violating his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process.  In all likelihood, the WIAA would assert 
that it is not a state actor and, as such, that it has not infringed on Stasiewski’s 
constitutional rights. 
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association, the Supreme Court held that an interscholastic athletic association 
comprised of both public and private schools could fall under the state action 
doctrine.1  In the years preceding that decision, courts nationwide found high 
school athletic associations to be state actors and, thus, within the purview of 
the U.S. Constitution.2  One court that has not decided whether its state’s 
interscholastic athletic association is a state actor is the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. 
1. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001). 
2. See e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987); Clark v. 
Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); 
La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224, 227–228 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 272–73 (10th Cir. 1963); Ind. High Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997); Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. 
Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774–75 (Miss. 1994); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 
A.2d 734, 736 (R.I. 1992). 
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The WIAA is the sole governing authority over high school athletics in 
Wisconsin.3  It is a voluntary, nonprofit organization that regulates both public 
and nonpublic high schools and middle schools.4  Despite the guidance set out 
for state action in Brentwood Academy, in the ten years since, the issue has 
never reached the Supreme Court of Wisconsin nor has it been specifically 
ruled on in Wisconsin’s lower courts.  Therefore, it is unknown if the WIAA is 
a state actor.  This Comment will demonstrate that, because of its pervasive 
entwinement with the State, the WIAA should be considered a state actor. 
Part II of this Comment will pose a hypothetical situation where Mike 
Stasiewski, a high school football player from a fictitious high school in 
Wisconsin, brings a due process claim against the WIAA after being 
suspended.  To provide the background for an analysis of Stasiewski’s claim, 
Part III will provide an overview of the state action doctrine and the relevant 
tests employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to find state action.  This part will 
culminate with an explanation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
Brentwood Academy decision.  Part IV will then provide an in-depth look at 
the WIAA’s makeup and functions, look at the scattered relevant Wisconsin 
case law, and finally will analyze whether Stasiewski has a viable 
constitutional claim by virtue of the WIAA potentially qualifying as a state 
actor. 
II. MIKE STASIEWSKI’S CLAIM 
Mike Stasiewski was a standout quarterback ready to begin his senior year 
at Lambeau West High School.  Stasiewski’s parents divorced over the 
summer, and, despite his adamant objections, Stasiewski was forced to live 
with his mother and continue attending Lambeau West, the closest public 
school to her home.  After leading the team to a WIAA Division I state title his 
junior year, Stasiewski was named the preseason First-Team All-State 
quarterback for his senior season. 
During the first week of practice, Stasiewski was notably detached.  As a 
result of his living situation, he had problems concentrating and would lose his 
composure at practice.  After a tumultuous week, Stasiewski could not handle 
the stress of living with his mother, so he packed up and moved in with his 
father on the other side of town.  Because his father lived in a different district, 
Stasiewski had to transfer to Lambeau East before the school year began, and, 
upon arrival at Lambeau East, he sought to play football.  When he met with 
3. About the WIAA, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php? id= 
500 (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). 
4. Id. 
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the athletic director at Lambeau East, he was informed that he was ineligible 
per WIAA transfer rules. 
A.  WIAA Bylaws 
Unfortunately for Stasiewski, the WIAA Rules of Eligibility provide a 
significant obstacle in obtaining eligibility to play football at Lambeau East.  
With regard to a student residence and transfer, the Rules of Eligibility state, 
in pertinent part: 
A.  A full time student, whether an adult or not, is eligible for 
varsity interscholastic competition only at the school within 
whose attendance boundaries his/her parents reside, within a 
given school district, with these additional provisions . . .  
3)  In the event of a divorce or legal separation, whether 
pending or final, a student’s residence at the beginning of the 
school year shall determine eligibility except in situations 
involving transfer after the fourth consecutive semester 
following entry into Grade 9.  For the purpose of this rule, 
attendance at one day of school and/or attendance at one 
athletic practice shall determine ‘beginning of school year.’  
Under this rule, a student who transfers after the beginning of 
the school year shall be ineligible at the new school unless 
approval is granted by the Board of Control in accordance 
with the transfer and/or waiver provisions . . . .5 
Any student who transfers after his fourth consecutive semester is 
ineligible to practice or compete for one calendar year unless the transfer was 
“made necessary by a total change in residence by parent(s).”6  Furthermore, 
in cases of divorced parents, a student who has established eligibility with one 
parent is ineligible to play sports if the student moves to live with the other 
parent and attends a different school.7  Because Stasiewski practiced for a full 
week at Lambeau West, he established eligibility there.  As such, he is 
ineligible to play at Lambeau East.  The only way for Stasiewski to challenge 
his ineligibility is to apply for a waiver. 
5. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N RULES OF ELIGIBILITY, art. II, § 1(A)(3) (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
6. Id. § 3(A)(1). 
7. Article II Residence and Transfer, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi. 
org/index.php?id=545 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
TREVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:08 PM 
290 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
B.  Mike Stasiewski’s Challenge 
The WIAA bylaws provide a small exception for a waiver of the transfer 
requirement if the school requests it in advance, on behalf of a student, and 
with a presentation of clear documentation showing extenuating 
circumstances.8  Stasiewski pled his case to the Lambeau School Board and 
the WIAA’s executive staff, but was summarily denied at each level without 
much consideration.  Because it was his senior year and losing a year of 
eligibility could potentially cost him a college scholarship, Stasiewski 
immediately filed for a preliminary injunction against enforcing the transfer 
rule as well as a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  His claim 
under § 1983 was that the WIAA did not give him an adequate opportunity to 
defend his waiver request, resulting in a violation of his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Furthermore, because § 1983 is a fee-shifting statute, which forces the losing 
party to pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing party, if Stasiewski’s claim 
carries the day, the WIAA will be responsible for paying the reasonable 
attorney’s fees that he incurred as a result of the suit.9 
The trial court held in favor of the WIAA on the grounds that the WIAA is 
not a state actor and, thus, cannot infringe on Stasiewski’s due process rights.  
The court of appeals affirmed, and the issue of whether the WIAA is a state 
actor is now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  If Stasiewski’s appeal and 
subsequent claim are successful, the WIAA will be enjoined from enforcing 
the transfer rule and will have to grant his waiver to play football at Lambeau 
East his senior year. 
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES TO 
BRENTWOOD ACADEMY 
Before Stasiewski’s case can be heard on the merits, a threshold analysis 
is required.  A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim requires that 
Stasiewski establish that the adverse party is a state actor.10  Because the most 
important issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court is whether the WIAA is 
8. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N RULES OF ELIGIBILITY, art. II, § 5(A)(2) (2011).  
“Such documentation must include communications from (a) parents, (b) person(s) with whom 
student is living within requesting school’s attendance boundaries and (c) school officials within 
whose attendance boundaries parents reside.”  Id. 
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2011). 
10. See Diane Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing 
Interscholastic Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).  The other three elements a claimant 
must establish in a due process claim are: (1) the plaintiff is a person; (2) he has a life, liberty, or 
property interest involved; and (3) the adverse party denied him procedural due process.  Id. 
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a state actor, this Comment will be restricted to that analysis. 
Any direct or indirect action by a government entity, public school, state 
university, state college, or any of its officials is always considered state action 
for the purposes of the U.S. Constitution because those entities act on behalf of 
the government.11  However, issues can arise when the purported state actor is 
not a part of one of these public entities because there is not a bright-line, all-
encompassing test for finding state action.12  The requirement that the adverse 
party be engaged in state action recognizes that the majority of the rights 
secured by the Constitution are protected from government infringement.13  
The doctrine preserves individual citizens’ autonomy by providing that private 
citizens can act freely without being subject to the constraints of the 
Constitution.14 
Throughout the U.S. Supreme Court’s history, the state action doctrine has 
undergone relatively dramatic changes.  One of the first instances where the 
Court was presented with the issue of state action was in The Civil Rights 
Cases, a consolidation of five cases in which the Court determined that 
discrimination by private individuals against African-Americans was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.15  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Bradley opined, “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the 
subject-matter of the amendment.”16  Although this decision is recognized as 
the first broad test for finding state action,17 the following sections will 
discuss two of the main state action tests discussed in the Brentwood Academy 
case: the public function test and the sufficient nexus analysis.  These tests are 
integral to the progeny of state action cases in the sports context because they 
served as the backbone for the Supreme Court’s entwinement test articulated 
in Brentwood Academy. 
A.  The Public Function Test 
The Court famously revisited the doctrine of state action in Marsh v. 
11. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 164–69, 196–97 (3d ed. 2002); Julie K. 
Brown, Note, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008). 
12. WONG, supra note 11, at 164–69, 196–97; Brown, supra note 11, at 564. 
13. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149, 156 (1978)). 
14. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur 
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 185 (2008). 
15. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883). 
16. Id. at 11. 
17. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961). 
TREVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:08 PM 
292 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
Alabama.18  In Marsh, the Court was asked to decide whether a state could 
convict a Jehovah’s Witness for criminal trespass for distributing religious 
literature within the confines of a company-owned town.19  The town had the 
same characteristics of any American town, except it was owned by the Gulf 
Shipbuilding Corporation.20  The plaintiff asserted that her conviction was in 
violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and claimed that the 
privately held town was a state actor.21  The Court agreed and, in doing so, set 
out the parameters for the public function test for finding state action.22  The 
Court held that mere ownership does not constitute absolute and uninhibited 
dominion.23  Rather, the more an owner opens up his property for use by the 
general public, the more his rights become limited by the constitutional rights 
of those who use the property.24  Because the town was built and operated to 
benefit the public, its operation was deemed a public function.25  Thus, despite 
its private ownership, the town itself was a state actor and had to operate under 
the constraints of the Constitution.26 
B.  The Sufficient Nexus Analysis 
The next step in the evolution of the state action doctrine was the “nexus 
analysis,” which finds state action when the government has required or 
significantly encouraged the specific act that infringes on an individual’s 
constitutional rights.27  The U.S. Supreme Court employed this analysis in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.28  In Burton, an African-American 
man was refused service at a coffee shop based solely on his race.29  The 
question of state action arose because the coffee shop was located in a parking 
18. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504 (1946). 
19. Id. at 502. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 504. 
22. Id. at 506–07; Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional 
Liability; Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARQ. 
SPORTS. L. REV. 365, 377–78 (2002). 
23. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 508–09. 
26. Id. 
27. Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Paula Alexander Becker, Is it Time to Revisit the Doctrine of “State 
Action” in the Context of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Sports?, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
191, 205 (2007). 
28. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723–24; Madry, supra note 22, at 378. 
29. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716. 
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structure that was owned and operated by a Delaware state agency.30  The 
land was publicly owned, the facility obtained funding from the city, and the 
facility was operated by the State.31  The Court held that the coffee shop, by 
virtue of its “involvement” with the State, was considered a state actor and had 
thus violated Burton’s Fourteenth Amendment protections.32  It opined that, 
“private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal 
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its 
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it.”33  When a state 
becomes sufficiently involved in a private project, the private entity has 
putatively become a state actor and can be held liable under constitutional 
standards through the nexus analysis.34 
C.  State Action and Amateur Athletics Collide Before the Supreme Court 
The 1970s–1980s were times of great change for the U.S. Supreme Court 
in both its composition and its approach to the state action doctrine.35  
Between 1969 and 1972, three new Justices—Warren, Powell, and 
Rehnquist—were appointed.36  During this period, Justice Rehnquist wrote 
five decisions applying the doctrine, notably strengthening the threshold for 
finding state action and making it more difficult for a plaintiff to show state 
action.37  This series of decisions arguably molded the state action test into its 
present form.38  However, until 1973, the issue of state action in amateur 
athletics had never reached the Court under any of the previously articulated 
state action tests. 
In 1973, Jerry “The Shark” Tarkanian took over as head coach of the 
basketball team at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV), a team that 
had previously been perennially mediocre at best.39  Within four years, 
Tarkanian had transformed UNLV into a powerhouse, going 29–3 and 
finishing third in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
tournament in 1977.40  Nevertheless, the sudden turnaround precipitated a 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 716–19. 
32. Id. at 724. 
33. Id. at 722. 
34. Madry, supra note 22, at 378. 
35. Koller, supra note 14, at 186. 
36. Madry, supra note 22, at 382. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1988). 
40. Throwing in the Towel: Fresno State’s Tarkanian Retires after 38 Years in Coaching, SI.COM 
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NCAA investigation of the basketball program, where the NCAA found thirty-
eight violations of NCAA rules by UNLV, including ten committed by 
Tarkanian himself.41  The NCAA put UNLV on probation for two years and 
ordered UNLV to sever all ties with Tarkanian during the probationary 
period.42  Tarkanian brought suit against UNLV and the NCAA, alleging that 
he had been deprived of his due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that the NCAA had engaged in state action when it 
recommended his suspension.43 
Although in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian the 
U.S. Supreme Court found that UNLV, as a state university, was 
unquestionably a state actor, it refused to hold that the NCAA also qualified as 
a state actor.44  Because the NCAA used no governmental powers in its 
investigation, as well as the fact that it gave UNLV options other than 
suspension, the Court found that the NCAA could not be a state actor.45  The 
Tarkanian Court noted that its finding applied to the NCAA but gave little 
guidance as to the application at the interscholastic level beyond an abstract 
footnote simply stating, “[t]he situation would, of course, be different if the 
membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State, 
many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign.”46  The issue 
of high school athletic associations as state actors did not reach the nation’s 
highest court until 2001 in Brentwood Academy.47  It was in Brentwood 
Academy that the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the entwinement test for 
finding state action; the factors discussed therein would be applicable for a 
Wisconsin court examining the WIAA. 
D.  The Entwinement of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association 
Brentwood Academy is a private Christian school in Tennessee and a 
perennial powerhouse in high school football.48  It has been nationally ranked 
by USA Today and has won numerous Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
(Mar. 15, 2002), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2002/03/15/tarkanian_ 
retires_ap/; 1977 NCAA Basketball Tournament Bracket, DATABASESPORTS.COM, http:// www. 
databasesports.com/ncaab/tourney.htm?yr=1977 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
41. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 180–81.z 
42. Id. at 181. 
43. Id. at 181–82. 
44. See id. at 192–99. 
45. Id. at 197–99. 
46. Id. at 193 n.13. 
47. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291. 
48. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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Association (TSSAA) state championships.49  The TSSAA is a voluntary high 
school athletic association.  At the time of the lawsuit, the TSSAA was 
comprised of 290 public schools and 55 private schools.50  Public schools 
made up eighty-four percent of the TSSAA’s voting population.51  Its power 
resided in the Board of Control, which consisted of nine elected members 
representing different regions of Tennessee.52  All of the board members were 
principals or superintendents of member schools serving in ex officio roles.53  
At all times relevant to the suit, the board members were exclusively from 
public schools, although private school administrators were technically 
eligible for election to the board as well.54  The TSSAA’s staff members were 
not paid by the State, but they were still eligible for the State’s public 
retirement system for school employees.55  The majority of the board 
meetings were held during official school hours.56  TSSAA received no state 
funding—revenues were derived primarily from ticket sales and, in small part, 
from dues paid by member schools.57  As for the actual competitions, the 
schools scheduled all athletic events, with the exception of the state 
tournaments.58  When the TSSAA used public facilities for events, it entered 
into contracts with the State and paid for their use.59 
In 1997, several rival football coaches alleged that Brentwood Academy 
violated the TSSAA rules for a number of reasons.60  The TSSAA promptly 
investigated the allegations and found three specific violations.  The two 
violations that were analyzed by the Sixth Circuit pertained to the recruiting 
rule.61  At the time of the suit, the TSSAA’s bylaws included a recruiting rule 
that provided: 
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an 
athletic record), his or her parents or guardians of a student by 
any person connected, or not connected, with the school to 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 762. 
51. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291. 
52. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 762. 
53. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 291. 
56. Id. at 299. 
57. Id. at 290–91. 
58. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 762. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 760–61. 
61. Id. at 760. 
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secure or retain a student for athletic purposes shall be a 
violation of the recruiting rule.62 
The first violation occurred when Brentwood’s football coach gave free 
football game tickets to a middle school coach and two of his players.63  The 
second violation involved a letter sent to all incoming ninth-graders committed 
to Brentwood, which invited them to join the team for spring practice.64 
As a result of the TSSAA’s finding that Brentwood violated the recruiting 
rule, Brentwood was ineligible to qualify for TSSAA tournaments in football 
and basketball for one year and was also given two years probation.65  
Brentwood appealed, but after the process ran its course, the penalties were 
increased.66  Brentwood was banned from tournaments for 2 years, placed on 
probation for 4 years, and fined $3000.67  Brentwood sued the TSSAA, 
praying for an injunction against enforcement of the recruiting rule, and filed a 
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The § 1983 claim alleged that 
Brentwood had been deprived of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.68  
The district court granted Brentwood’s summary judgment motion on its First 
Amendment claim and enjoined the TSSAA’s enforcement of the recruiting 
rule.69  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded for proceedings consistent 
with its opinion.70  The court analyzed the TSSAA’s involvement with the 
State and applied the public function test as well as a variation of the nexus 
analysis.71  In regard to both, the court held that Brentwood failed to establish 
that the TSSAA’s actions were fairly attributed to the State.72 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit, 
holding that the TSSAA was a state actor by way of the newly articulated 
“entwinement test.”73  Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began by 
noting that “no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board 
62. Id. at 761. 
63. Id. at 760. 
64. Id. at 760–61. 
65. Id. at 761. 
66. Id.  There is no articulated reason in either of the Brentwood Academy decisions for why the 
penalties were increased. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 766. 
71. Id. at 763–64. 
72. Id. at 766. 
73. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 304. 
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for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, 
for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the 
government.”74 
The Court found that the TSSAA’s private nature was greatly outweighed 
by the pervasive entwinement of its member public schools and officials.75  
The public school ex officio staff could only be reasonably viewed as actors 
representing their institutions within the scope of their public school duties.76  
The TSSAA provided the mechanism for producing rules for its members, and 
regulating eighty-four percent of which were Tennessee’s public school 
athletic teams.77  The Court found entwinement from the bottom up between 
the public school officials and the TSSAA.78 
The Court opined further that the State had provided entwinement from 
the top down by assigning ex officio members to control the TSSAA’s 
legislative arm and by providing all officials with eligibility for the State’s 
retirement system.79  The Court reasoned that the entwined relationship was 
further evidenced by the TSSAA’s enforcement of the same preamendment 
regulations that were reviewed and approved by the State Board.80  The 
TSSAA argued that under the public function test, it could not be viewed as a 
state actor.81  However, the Court disagreed, stating, “[w]hen, therefore, the 
relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping 
identity, the implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the 
facts might not loom large under a different test.”82 
The Brentwood Academy holding was a landmark decision because it was 
the first time the Supreme Court found that a high school athletic association 
was a state actor.  However, the Supreme Court did not hold that all athletic 
associations are state actors.  It merely held that the TSSAA is a state actor.83  
Thus, the importance of Brentwood Academy is not its holding, but rather the 
test it employed to get to that holding.84  In deciding whether the WIAA is a 
state actor for the purposes of Mike Stasiewski’s claim, a careful analysis of 
74. Id. at 295–96. 
75. Id. at 298. 
76. Id. at 299. 
77. Id. at 299–300. 
78. Id. at 300. 
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 301. 
81. Id. at 302–03. 
82. Id. at 303. 
83. Id. at 302. 
84. Id. 
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the entwinement test, as set out in Brentwood Academy, will likely be 
determinative for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
IV. IS MIKE STASIEWSKI’S CLAIM AGAINST THE WIAA VIABLE? 
The WIAA is the first organized high school athletic association in the 
country, with its roots dating back to 1895.85  The WIAA is a self-proclaimed 
voluntary, nonprofit organization made up of public and private high schools 
and middle schools throughout Wisconsin.86  In 2000, the WIAA became the 
state’s sole governing body over high school athletics when the Wisconsin 
Independent School Athletic Association, the governing authority over private 
high schools, disbanded and its private member schools joined the WIAA.87 
A.  How the WIAA Works 
The WIAA is presently comprised of 506 schools, about 70 of which are 
private.88  Member schools govern the WIAA, and its rules and policies are 
developed by its membership through vote or by membership-elected 
committees.89  Several advisory committees exist and are comprised of 
coaches, athletic directors, and school administrators.90  All WIAA 
committees meet during school days and during school hours.91  Three of 
those committees, the Board of Control, the Advisory Council, and the Sports 
Advisory Committee are made up of elected high school administrators, and 
each has only one requisite representative from a non-public school.92  The 
other committees—the Sportsmanship Committee, the Ad hoc Committees, 
the Officials Advisory, the Coaches Advisory, and the Medical Advisory—are 
85. History of the WIAA, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.wiaawi.org/ 
index.php?id=458 (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
86. About the WIAA, supra note 3. 
87. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC 
ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=527 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
88.  WIAA Member Schools Directory, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www. 
wiaawi.org/index.php?id=364 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
89. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. IX. 
90. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N HANDBOOK 2011–12 - INTRODUCTION TO THE 
WIAA 3, 5 [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA]. 
91. See Board of Control, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index. 
php?id=158 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); Advisory Council, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=159 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011); Sports Advisory Committee, WIS. 
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=160 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011); 
Coaches Advisory, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=161 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011); Sportsmanship Committee, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=164 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
92. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 5, 7. 
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all appointed positions.93  All of these positions are unpaid.94  The WIAA 
retains liaisons to the Board of Control outside of these committees,95 which 
are necessary because the WIAA’s relationship with these organizations is so 
close that it is important for them to be present to feed information back and 
forth during meetings.96  These liaisons are representatives from the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, the Wisconsin Association of 
School Boards, and the Wisconsin Athletic Directors Association.97 
The WIAA receives no state funding; therefore, the majority of its funding 
comes from gate admissions at playoff games, officials’ fees, and dues from 
its member schools.98  Scheduling regular season competitions is the 
responsibility of local school districts or individual conferences; however, 
once the playoffs roll around, the WIAA does all the scheduling and facilitates 
the games.99 
Each school is provided with the WIAA handbook and is expected to fully 
understand the rules it sets out.100  Compliance with the rules is the 
responsibility of each individual school.101  The WIAA’s executive staff is 
informed when a rule is broken or when there is a question of whether a rule 
applies in a given situation.102 
Rules are amended by a vote of the entire membership, but the Board of 
Control makes the final decisions in determining the outcome of rule 
changes.103  A simple majority is required to amend a rule.104  All of these 
characteristics would need to be analyzed to determine if the WIAA is a state 
actor for the purposes of Stasiewski’s claim.  Although the issue has never 
been addressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a few lower courts have 
touched on state action and the WIAA in the past forty years. 
93. Telephone Interview with Todd Clark, Director of Commc’n and Advanced Media, Wis. 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n (Aug. 24, 2010) (recording on file with author). 
94. Id. 
95. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3, 5. 
96. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93. 
97. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3. 
98. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93. 
99. Id. 
100. About the WIAA, supra note 3. 
101. Id. 
102. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93. 
103. Board of Control, supra note 91; How are Rules Developed or Changed?, WIS. 
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.wiaawi.org/index.php?id=7 (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011). 
104. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. IX, § 2(B). 
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B.  Case Law on State Action with Regard to the WIAA 
Twenty years prior to Brentwood Academy, two Wisconsin district court 
decisions addressed whether the WIAA could be considered a state actor 
against constitutional claims.  In Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic 
Association, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
found that, because the plaintiffs failed to plead anything about state action in 
their complaint, the WIAA could not be a state actor.105  Four years later, in 
Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, the Eastern District 
Court was called upon to determine whether co-educational athletics violated 
equal protection under a § 1983 claim when a group of female students 
brought a class action suit against the WIAA alleging that a WIAA rule was in 
violation of Title IX.106  The court found the WIAA was a state actor because 
the WIAA exerted direct influence upon the school’s athletic programs.107  
However, these cases would likely be of little precedential value today 
because they were decided more than thirty years ago, long before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brentwood Academy.  In the years since Kelly 
and Leffel, the WIAA has undergone significant changes in its makeup, most 
notably becoming the sole governing body for interscholastic sports in 
Wisconsin.108  Any state action case involving an interscholastic athletic 
association would need to be analyzed in light of the Brentwood Academy 
case, which was decided almost thirty years after Kelly and Leffel. 
The first post-Brentwood Academy decision in Wisconsin was Bukowski v. 
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, an unpublished court of 
appeals decision.109  Bukowski is the only instance where a Wisconsin state 
court was called on to determine whether the WIAA qualifies as a state 
actor.110  Bukowski, a male student at a public high school, sought an 
injunction to enjoin the WIAA from enforcing a rule that disallowed him from 
competing on the girls’ gymnastics team.111  Bukowski alleged that the rule 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 
Title IX.112  The court gave short shrift to Bukowski’s argument that the 
WIAA qualifies as a state actor because “Bukowski failed to produce any 
105. Kelly v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 367 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
106. Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1119–21 (E.D. Wis. 1978). 
107. Id. at 1119; see Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 398 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D. 
Wis. 1975). 
108. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, supra note 87. 
109. Bukowski v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 2007 WI App 1, ¶ 9. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. ¶ 1. 
112. Id. 
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evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, demonstrating that the WIAA is a state 
actor.”113  The only evidence Bukowski brought forward to establish state 
action was an affidavit by the district superintendent stating that the high 
school receives federal funding.114  However, the mere receipt of federal 
funds does not qualify the entity as a state actor.115  Because Bukowski was 
unable to proffer any legitimate evidence, the court found for the WIAA.116 
In a 2008-unpublished decision, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court held 
the exact opposite, finding that the WIAA is a state actor in Wakefield v. 
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association.117  In Wakefield, a student 
challenged the WIAA’s transfer rule that disallowed transfer students from 
competing in athletics for one calendar year.118  As a preliminary matter, to 
determine whether the court could review the WIAA’s decisions, the court 
examined whether the WIAA was a state actor and thus subject to judicial 
review.119  Citing Brentwood Academy as authority, the court found that the 
WIAA is a state actor.120  The court noted that its entwinement mirrors some 
of the factors of Brentwood Academy.121  For instance, every public senior 
high school is a member, and there is no competing regulatory athletic 
association in Wisconsin.122  Both the WIAA and the TSSAA receive funding 
through dues from members, which largely consist of public schools that are 
funded from state tax dollars.123  Furthermore, the court found that the 
member schools have clearly delegated the power to regulate interscholastic 
athletics to the WIAA because the students have no status with the WIAA, 
whereas the schools do.124  Finally, the court found it determinative that the 
WIAA works closely with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction by 
having a liaison present at meetings.125 
Lastly, in June 2010, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin, in Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association v. 
113. Id. ¶ 11. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. ¶ 17. 
117. Wakefield v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, No. 08CV003423, at 7–9 (Milwaukee 
Cty., Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008). 
118. Id. at 3. 
119. Id. at 5, 7. 
120. Id. at 8–9. 
121. Id. at 8. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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Gannett Co., decided a case challenging the WIAA’s media policy.126  
Gannett claimed that the WIAA violated its First Amendment and equal 
protection rights by giving a company the exclusive license to stream certain 
tournament games.127  Although the issue of whether the WIAA was a state 
actor was not the main point of contention in the case, the WIAA went so far 
as to stipulate that it was a state actor for the purposes of both claims.128  In a 
footnote, the district court stated, “[b]ecause the parties have stipulated that 
WIAA is a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, 
that issue will not be addressed.”129  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reiterated 
that “[t]he parties have stipulated that WIAA is a state actor.  This means that 
its actions are constrained by the First Amendment.  (We note that in other 
cases where courts had to decide if similar organizations were state actors, the 
answer has been yes . . . . )”130  By its own stipulation, the WIAA conceded 
that it is a state actor.  Since Gannett, no reported decisions have addressed 
state action and the WIAA. 
C.  What to Make of Wisconsin’s Scattered Case Law? 
Because the issue of whether the WIAA qualifies as a state actor has never 
reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Stasiewski’s attorney would be forced 
to sort out the inconsistent decisions of the lower courts when analyzing 
Stasiewski’s claim.  In five decisions, courts found that the WIAA was a state 
actor three times—once by way of stipulation—and found the opposite twice.  
Three of these decisions were in federal court and would not be binding, while 
the two state court decisions were unpublished and, by statute,131 carry no 
precedential value.  Two of these cases were decided before the WIAA even 
accepted private schools into its membership.  Other than Bukowski and 
Wakefield, no Wisconsin court, even outside of the sport context, has analyzed 
the state action doctrine under Brentwood Academy’s entwinement test.132  On 
their face, the cases that do analyze state action would seem to be of little 
guidance.  However, a closer look reveals a potential explanation for the 
126. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 773, 783–84 (W.D. Wis. 
2010). 
127. Id. at 786, 796. 
128. Id. at 785 n.6. 
129. Id. 
130. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., No. 10-2627, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17684, *4–5 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2011) (citing Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298; Crane v. Ind. High Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). 
131. See WIS. STAT. § 809.23 (2011). 
132. See Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1, at ¶¶ 10–11; Wakefield, No. 08CV003423 at 9. 
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inconsistencies. 
Judging by the written opinions, it is clear that in the cases where courts 
found that the WIAA was not a state actor the threshold requirement of state 
action was not discussed in the plaintiff’s briefs and arguments.  For instance, 
in Kelly, the plaintiffs failed to establish a case for state action in their 
pleadings.133  Similarly, in Bukowski, the only proffered evidence in support 
of a finding of state action was an affidavit stating that the school received 
federal funding, which alone does not trigger state action.134  In order to bring 
a successful due process claim, Stasiewski’s attorney will need to make a 
much stronger case with regard to state action before arguing against the 
transfer rule, akin to the plaintiff in Wakefield, and avoid the pitfalls 
demonstrated by the advocates in Kelly and Bukowski.  The following sections 
will explain why, under the entwinement standard set forth in Brentwood 
Academy, Stasiewski will be able to show that the WIAA is a state actor. 
D.  The WIAA as a State Actor 
In analyzing the decisions in the WIAA cases and Brentwood Academy, it 
is clear that courts apply an incredibly fact-based approach in determining 
whether an athletic association is a state actor.135  To that end, a fact-based 
inquiry is likely how the Wisconsin Supreme Court would approach 
Stasiewski’s due process claim.  Because the WIAA, when viewed in the 
aggregate, is sufficiently entwined with the State of Wisconsin, the court will 
likely find that it is a state actor. 
One of the factors that may be determinative for the court in deciding 
whether the WIAA is a state actor is the WIAA’s make-up.  The WIAA’s 
committee members are almost exclusively public school employees.136  
These committees are ultimately responsible for making and amending the 
bylaws of the entire WIAA.137  The Board of Control and the Advisory 
Council are comprised of twenty-eight administrators from high schools 
around the state and one liaison from the Wisconsin Association of School 
133. Kelly, 367 F. Supp. at 1390. 
134. Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1, at ¶ 11. 
135. See generally Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288; Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1; Leffel, 444 F. Supp. 
1117; Kelly, 367 F. Supp. 1388; Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 773; Wakefield, No. 08CV003423. 
136. See generally Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports 
Advisory Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee, 
supra note 91. 
137. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory 
Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee, supra note 
91. 
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Boards.138  Twenty-six of the twenty-eight voting high school administrators 
on these two committees are public employees.139  The public school 
administrators, who are paid by the State of Wisconsin, are the individuals 
making the decisions and making the rules for the organization that serves as 
the sole governing body over athletics in Wisconsin.140 
The TSSAA’s Board of Control in Brentwood Academy mirrors the make-
up of the WIAA.  In both organizations, the power chiefly resides with public 
school officials.141  In Brentwood Academy, this exact make-up is what was 
determinative in the U.S. Supreme Court’s finding that the TSSAA was so 
entwined with the State so as to qualify it as a state actor.142  The WIAA may 
counter this assertion by noting that these committee members provide 
services for the WIAA only in their capacity as committee members.  
However, as public officials acting as representatives from their respective 
districts and schools, it is difficult to imagine that they are able to completely 
“step out” of their roles as administrators when voting on behalf of their 
schools and constituency. 
The entwinement between the WIAA and the State is further evidenced by 
representatives from state organizations, such as the Department of Public 
Instruction and the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, which serve as 
liaisons to the Board of Control.143  These liaisons are necessary to the 
WIAA’s functionality because the relationships are so close that they need to 
constantly feed information back and forth.144  The liaison for the Wisconsin 
Association of School Boards even has a voting member on the Board of 
Control.145  The entwinement between the WIAA’s decision-makers and the 
State is arguably stronger than that found in Brentwood Academy because of 
the close relationship with the liaisons.  Furthermore, in Gannett, the WIAA 
went so far as to stipulate that it was a state actor.146  Any analysis of this 
stipulation would be pure conjecture, but the fact remains that an organization 
cannot simply pick and choose to be a state actor when it is convenient for it. 
138. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91. 
139. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91. 
140. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, supra note 87. 
141. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 292–93; See generally Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory 
Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; 
Sportsmanship Committee, supra note 91. 
142. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300. 
143. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3. 
144. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93. 
145. Board of Control, supra note 91. 
146. Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 785 n.6; Gannett Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17684 at *4–
5. 
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Although state funding alone does not amount to state action,147 it 
certainly can be a factor.148  The WIAA’s membership is comprised of more 
than 500 schools, and, of those, about 420 are public schools.149  Although it 
receives no direct funding from the state, nearly all of the WIAA’s funding 
comes from membership fees and gate receipts from playoff competitions.150  
Almost eighty-five percent of its membership dues are paid by public schools, 
which, in turn, receive their own funding from federal, state, and local 
governments.151  The playoff gate receipts are for competitions held almost 
exclusively at public schools,152 which are maintained by public employees.  
For example, the state championships for all divisions in basketball, football, 
tennis, swimming and diving, golf, and softball are held at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, while the track and field championships are held at the 
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse.153  Furthermore, each and every WIAA 
meeting is held during the school day.154  Because a vast majority of the 
committee members attending these meetings are public school administrators 
and teachers, the committee members are attending the meetings as a part of 
their work day.  As such, the State is essentially paying the WIAA committee 
members to attend. 
These factors all boil down to one conclusion: the WIAA is so entwined 
with the State that it can be considered a state actor.  Stasiewski’s attorney 
would be wise to draw parallels between the WIAA and the TSSAA to 
illustrate just how pervasive the State’s role is in governing the WIAA.  By 
pointing out that, in both cases, the associations are primarily comprised of 
public schools, the people responsible for creating and amending the rules are 
public employees, the association’s meetings are held during school hours, and 
the associations are funded from revenue garnered at public schools for state 
playoffs and in part by public school dues, Stasiewski will be able to show 
state action and succeed where the plaintiffs in Bukowski and Kelly did not.  
147. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court found that a private high school that received ninety to 
ninety-nine percent of its budget from state and federal funds was not a state actor.  457 U.S. 830, 
832, 840 (1982). 
148. See generally Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288. 
149. WIAA Member Schools Directory, supra note 88. 
150. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. WIAA State Tournament Dates, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi. 
org/?id=99 (last visited Feb. 25. 2011). 
154. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory 
Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee, supra note 
91. 
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Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court will likely find that the WIAA is a 
state actor, Stasiewski’s claim that the WIAA violated his procedural due 
process rights by denying his waiver to the transfer rule will go forward on its 
merits.  In Brentwood Academy, once the U.S. Supreme Court found the 
TSSAA to be a state actor, the recruiting rule at issue was subject to judicial 
review, and eventually the matter made its way back to the Supreme Court.155  
Similarly, because Stasiewski can show that the WIAA engages in state action, 
the transfer rule at issue could be legally challenged and potentially struck 
down. 
The implications of the WIAA finally being ruled a state actor could be 
far-reaching, as it opens up the WIAA to constitutional claims.  Civil rights 
claims under § 1983 could be attached to these actions, and, if successful, the 
WIAA would be responsible for paying the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney 
fees.  Disgruntled athletes who feel their rights have been violated by the 
WIAA Rules of Eligibility or Bylaws would have grounds to bring claims 
under a myriad of constitutional claims such as equal protection, due process, 
and free speech.  Eventually, a case such as Stasiewski’s will reach the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and, once the WIAA is found to be a state actor, 
it will no longer enjoy immunity from constitutional claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because of the competitive nature inherent in interscholastic sports, 
eligibility rules are constantly challenged.  And for every challenge, there is an 
unhappy party on the losing side.  Stasiewski’s claim that the WIAA violated 
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is not a hypothetical 
lawsuit that could never occur.  Whether the claim involves due process, free 
speech, or any other violation of an athlete’s constitutional rights, it is only a 
matter of time before a case along these lines makes it before the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin.  When it does, it will be heard on its merits because the 
court will likely find that the WIAA is a state actor.  Based on the 
administrative capacity of public school officials in the WIAA, its function as 
the sole arm for interscholastic sports, its close relationship with the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, its indirect receipt of state funds,  
 
 
 
155. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 551 U.S. 291 
(2007).  Other courts that have found an athletic association to be a state actor have also allowed rule 
challenges to proceed on the merits.  See e.g., Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 
222 (Ind. 1997). 
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and its revenue derived from use of public facilities, the WIAA is inextricably 
entwined with the State of Wisconsin and qualifies as a state actor. 
Joseph P. Trevino 
